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of the soul for some real or supposed good. . . . The good means anything which will satisfy the craving, and from the possession of which it is believed that pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction, or happiness will be derived" (p. 211). But on the next page he says: "It is not true that desire always seeks for that which men call pleasurable; sometimes it craves that which causes care, anxiety, and pain" (p. 212). In discussing the freedom of the will he remarks: "The essence of the freedom of volition consists in the power we have to give preponderance to motives, or to make any selected desire or motive the strongest for the time. This preponderance is secured by giving fixed and earnest attention to the selected desire" (p. 226). But what is it that leads us to give such special attention to one particular motive? Is it anything but another desire? If not, then Mr. Putnam's theory only pushes the problem one step further back, and does not solve it at all.

The book will doubtless be useful to students in normal and other secondary schools, for whom it is chiefly intended; but it shows what all the deeper thinkers are well aware of, that we cannot have a satisfactory psychology till we have a satisfactory philosophy. We can, indeed, describe the mental processes without reference to philosophy; but the moment we attempt to explain them we run straight back to the fundamental problems of epistemology and ethics, and until these are solved no satisfactory explanation of mental processes can be given.

JAMES B. PETERSON.

The Human Nature Club: An Introduction to the Study of Mental Life.

By EDWARD THORNDIKE. New York and London, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1901.—pp. vi, 235.

This book consists of a series of dialogues on psychology, the various interlocutors being mostly mere students of the subject, though a few already have some knowledge of it. The dialogue is pretty well sustained, the author's style being clear and lively, and the various topics being introduced for the most part in an easy and natural way. It has, however, as the author himself admits, none of the dramatic power that marks the dialogues of Plato, the characters having no distinct individuality. The club was formed expressly for the study of mental life, and meets at stated intervals for that purpose; and at the various meetings one topic after another is introduced until a considerable portion of the mental field is covered. The question arises, however, whether the dialogue form is the best for such a purpose. I, for one, have no great fondness for it, even Plato's conversations being sometimes tiresome, while in less skilful hands the method is apt to leave on the reader an impression of vagueness and sometimes of uncertainty as to the author's views. Dr. Thorndike, however, generally makes his meaning plain, though he finds it necessary in most cases to add a few notes at the end of the chapter, giving in ordinary form the gist of what the members of the club have been saying.

With regard to the matter of the book, I cannot speak very favorably. Most of what the author says is unobjectionable, but some of it is hardly appropriate to an introductory work, and the omissions are very serious. The substance of the work, in fact, consists mainly of the psychological fads of the last quarter-century. After a brief introductory chapter we are treated to an account of the nervous system, and then come reflex action, sensation, 'reaction,' etc., but very little about mental life. The subject of judgment is indeed touched upon, but only touched, and no one who got his knowledge of it from this book would imagine that it was the leading form of intellectual activity. As for reasoning, inductive or deductive, the author seems to have forgotten that there is such a thing. The moral nature, too, is very insufficiently treated, neither the nature of morality nor the moral sentiments being described. There is, indeed, a peculiarly hazy chapter on the freedom of the will, and there are some good remarks on the formation of useful habits. Dr. Thorndike seems to me to exaggerate the power of education in the moral life, for he thinks that "truth-telling, diligence, attentiveness, integrity, unselfishness, charity, and the like are all probably characteristics acquired after birth. Speaking broadly, *civilization*, including morality, is in each human being an acquisition, not an inherited trait" (p. 186). Now it is true that habits, whether good or bad, are acquired after birth; but surely each person inherits a certain disposition, which has a great influence in deciding what habits he will form.

Dr. Thorndike accepts Professor James's theory of the emotions, which is too well known to the readers of this REVIEW to require comment. Of course, hypnotism and suggestion come in for treatment, and are fairly well described. One of the most disagreeable things in the book is the constant repetition of the term 'reaction' as applied to all the activities of the mind. The term as used of late by psychologists has a quite different meaning from that given it by Newton, when he stated the law that action and reaction are always in opposite directions. Moreover, in the new sense of the word every event in the universe is a 'reaction,' and the only 'actions' in the whole world of being are those of the First Cause. Some other points in Dr. Thorndike's work might call for remark if space permitted; but I have said enough to show its general character, and both its merits and its defects.

JAMES B. PETERSON.

Nouvelles recherches sur l'esthétique et la morale. Par J.-P. DURAND (de Gros). Paris, Félix Alcan, 1900.—p. 275.

This book, written a third of a century ago, and its author, have much of human as well as scientific interest. The warmer interest is aroused, not alone by the recent death of the author, on November 17, 1900, nor wholly by the contrast between the attention his biological and philosophical writings now receive, and their comparative neglect at the time of